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algorithm. Based on this assumption, many useful lightweight
authentication protocols have been proposed. Unfortunately,
those protocols cannot be applied to supply chains due to the
requirements of dynamical node changes and routing authentication in a supply chain. In this paper, we provide a sound
solution to supply chain security. Our scheme provides the
mutual authentication, routing authentication, and dynamically
node changes. Our scheme adopts lightweight cryptography,
which only requires hashing for RFID tags. We assume that
the readers have more computational power and therefore are
able to handle public-key-based computations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
present the model of our RFID supply chain in section II, our
solution in section III, security analysis in section IV, and the
conclusion in section V.

Abstract—Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology
has been widely used in supply chains to track and manage
shipments. By tagging shipments with RFID tags, which can be
remotely accessed by RFID readers, shipments can be identified
and tracked in a supply chain. Security issues in RFID have been
major concerns, since passive RFID tags have very weak computational power to support authentication. Sound authentication
between tag and reader remains a challenging problem. In this
paper, we provide a novel authentication scheme to protect tags
from being tracked and identified by unauthorized readers and
protect authorized readers against bogus tags. Our scheme can
be applied to supply chain security. It also exhibits an additional
feature that a supply chain can be dynamically updated.
Index Terms—RFID Security, Authentication, Supply Chain.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an automatic identification method based on reading and writing data remotely
at certain frequency between devices. A typical RFID system
consists of an RFID tag, an RFID reader and a back-end
server. Most commonly used RFID tags are passive tags, which
can only be powered by readers’ interrogation signals. RFID
readers can remotely retrieve data in RFID tags and submit
data to the online back-end server. The useful information
about RFID technology can be found in [1].
RFID tags are seemed as the next generation of bar-codes.
Each product can be put into an RFID tag with an universally
unique tag ID. This can cut off customers’ waiting time,
improve efficiency, and prevent shoplifting [2]. One of most
important applications of RFID technology is supply chain
management. By attaching passive RFID tags to shipments
[3], RFID systems can improve supply chain visibility, which
is useful to track and manage shipments in a supply chain.
However, there are many security issues in current RFID
supply chain systems. Mutual authentication is needed when
shipments reach readers in the supply chain. Tags should be
protected from being tracked by unauthorized parties. Security
threats like eavesdropping, replay attack and malicious probing
are real [4].
There are many existing approaches (e.g., [5], [6], [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11]) aiming to solve the authentication problems,
based on lightweight authentication. It is generally assumed
that a passive RFID tag can only handle a lightweight hashing
978-0-7695-4322-2/10 $26.00 © 2010 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/EUC.2010.94

II. M ODEL OF THE RFID S UPPLY C HAIN
A supply chain consists of three parts: shipments, nodes
equipped with readers and a back-end server. For a specific
shipment, an item departs from the initial node and ends at
the final node. All other nodes are called intermediate nodes.
In the initial node, each shipment is attached with an RFID
tag which contains a unique identity of the shipment, some
parameters used for authentication and a routing table. The
routing table includes all the intermediate nodes in the route
and some information about those intermediate nodes, which
will be used for the tag-reader mutual authentication.
When a shipment arrives at an intermediate node, the
RFID tag will require the reader in this node to provide its
authentication information. During the reader authentication
process, the tag checks whether this reader is legitimate
according to the routing table by the proposed authentication
protocol. If the reader is indeed the next reader in the routing
table, then the authentication of the reader is successful. After
the authentication of the reader, the reader will verify the
preceding node of the shipment. If there is an online back-end
server connected, the current reader will submit its identity
and the preceding position of the shipment to seek further
authentication from the server. This authentication process is
done by the reader using public-key algorithms. Namely, when
the goods is about to leave the current node, the reader will
583

between the back-end server and the reader. The routing table
should be provided by the back-end server.
Table II is an example of a routing table. The Table II
indicates that the route is C, B, A, E, ....

insert its digital signature into the tag. This signature is used
to authenticate the preceding node by the next node.
Our protocol allows dynamical routing changes. It is quite
common that the pre-defined route is not suitable due to an
unseen situation at a node. In this case, an alternative node
has to be selected. We provide a solution for this case.
Malicious RFID readers can remotely probe tags trying to
get some valuable information. In this situation, authentication
is needed. In case of supply chains, there are two kinds of
authentication choices that require to authenticate the route.
The first one does not require a routing table stored in a
tag [7]. In this case, the authentication is usually done by
checking the hash value and the pre-defined value shared
among tags and all readers. Once the hash values match,
the authentication is regarded to be successful. However, this
kind of authentication is very weak, because tags can only
know that the corresponding reader is within the same system
without knowing the sequence. Moreover, once the sole shared
value is compromised, the system is broken [12]. We adopt the
second choice which utilizes a routing table stored in a tag.
We also adopt a novel lightweight cryptographic approach that
assures much stronger mutual authentication.

TABLE II
E XAMPLE OF A ROUTING TABLE .
1
IDC
(tidj )SC

A. Initialization
All notations that will be used in this paper are presented
in Table I.
TABLE I
N OTATIONS OF OUR PROTOCOL .

tidj
IDl
IDα
vj
Sα
r
(m)Sα
z←y

3
IDA
(tidj )SA

4
IDE
(tidj )SE

...
...
...

An index i is used for a tag to find which column in
the routing table contains the next reader’s information. i is
initialized to 1. If i is equal to 3, then the next reader is reader
A according to the routing table. After a tag passes a reader,
the value of i should be updated to i + 1. A preceding position
index G can show which reader is a tag’s last passed reader.
Set G = g xkα mod p, where kα is the private key of reader α
and g kα mod p is the corresponding public key, g is a generator
of Zp∗ , p ∈ Zp is a safe prime. g kα mod p is also used as the
Schnorr signature verification key. S = Sigin (H(tidj , IDα ))
denotes the Schnorr signature from the node α. The form of
the signature is predefined. We will describe it in the protocol.
For simplicity, we will omit the modulo p in the rest of
presentation.
We define a special value vj for a tag j to cope with route
changes. The back-end server has an ID-v table to keep a
copy of v of every tag. The update of the value of vj for a
tag j and the back-end server should be synchronized.

III. P ROPOSED S OLUTION

Notation
x
i
G
kα
kl
H(m)
S

2
IDB
(tidj )SB

TABLE III
E XAMPLE OF A PUBLIC KEY TABLE .

Meaning
a secret shared among all readers and back-end server.
index to the routing table.
preceding position index.
reader α private key.
preceding reader’s private key.
hash value of m.
preceding reader’s signature, Sig(H(m)),
where m is not included. We use Schnorr signature scheme.
ID for tag j.
ID of the reader for the preceding position.
ID of reader α.
special value used for add-new-stop modes,
where j is an index associated with tag j.
the symmetric key shared between the server and reader α.
a random number.
m encrypted with symmetric key Sα .
y is assigned to z.

g kA
IDA

g kB
IDB

g kC
IDC

g kD
IDD

g kE
IDE

...
...

TABLE IV
E XAMPLE OF A ROUTE - CHANGE TABLE .
vb
tidb

ve
tide

vm
tidm

...
...

Every reader has a public key table which can be used to
find the ID of a reader corresponding to a public key. This
table has the ID and public key of every reader in the system.
An example of public key table is in Table III.
The back-end server keeps an ID-v table which stores all
tag’s IDs and the value of v of a tag. An example of ID-v
table is given in Table V.

We require that all nodes in the system share a security
parameter x. Every reader and the back-end server share
a secret symmetric key. All readers in the system have a
public/private key pair.
In the initial node, a tag j is initialized with the following
values: a routing table, an index i, a preceding position index
G, a preceding reader’s signature S, and a special value vj . A
routing table indicates the sequence of nodes this tag should
reach. Each column in the table has three values: a number, a
reader ID, and tag ID encrypted by the symmetric key shared

TABLE V
E XAMPLE OF AN ID-v TABLE .
va
tida

vb
tidb

vc
tidc

vd
tidd

ve
tide

...
...

Every reader keeps a route-change table which stores information of route changes for some tags. Each column of
the table is obtained from the server’s route-change table.
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Tag j

Reader A(x)
probe

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
r
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

choose r
i

IDA0 ← routing table

calculate H(r, IDA )

H(r,IDA )

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

?

H(r, IDA0 ) = H(r, IDA )
1, (tidj )SA , H((tidj )SA ,r), G, S

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

decrypt

tidj ←−−−− (tidj )SA
−1
G
= (g xkl )x = g kl
x−1

g kl

IDl ← public key table
verify S using g kl , tidj and IDl
calculate (g kA )x
calculate Sig(H(tidj , IDA ))
g xkA , Sig(H(tidj ,IDA ))

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
G ← g xkA
S ← Sig(H(tidj , IDA ))
i←i+1
Fig. 1.

Normal Mode

and tidj now, it can verify the signature. By verifying
the signature of the preceding reader, reader A obtains
the previous position of the tag. Reader A logs tidj
and IDl or submits these two values to online server.
Reader A computes (g kA )x = g xkA and its signature
Sig(H(tidj , IDA )), where kA is the private key of reader
A.
9: Reader A sends g xkA and Sig(H(tidj , IDA )) to the tag.
10: The tag updates G ← g xkA and S ← Sig(H(tidj , IDA ))
and increments i ← i + 1.
In this protocol, we use the routing table for the authentication of readers by checking whether reader A is the next reader
in the routing table. If H(r, IDA ) equals to H(r, IDA0 ), the
tag authenticates reader A. We utilized digital signatures for
the verification of the route. Notice that position’s IDs are not
−1
−1
sent in clear and is in the form of Gx = (g xkl )x = g kl
that is also the public key used to verify the signature.
The structure of the signature is pre-defined. Reader A
learns tidj by decrypting (tidj )SA and IDl by checking g kl
in the public key table. So there is no need to send the signed
plaintext of the signature. After authenticating the tag, the
reader will calculate a new preceding position index g xkA and
its signature. The tag updates G and S which will be forwarded
to the next node by the tag. The tag increments the counter i
to i + 1 pointing to the next node in the routing table.

Different readers have different route-change tables. Table IV
shows an example of a route-change table. As we can see,
the route-change table in a reader is actually part of the ID-v
table in the server.
B. Protocols
Normal Mode. In this mode, a shipment process is performed
normally. A tag firstly authenticates the corresponding reader
and then sends the information about the tag itself to allow
the reader to authenticate it. The protocol is given in Figure
1 and described in the following steps:
1: Reader A probes the tag remotely.
2: The tag chooses a random value r.
3: The tag sends the random value r to reader A.
4: Reader A calculates H(r, IDA ). IDA is reader A’s ID.
5: Reader A sends the H(r, IDA ) to the tag.
6: The tag finds the corresponding value IDA0 to the index i
in the routing table, calculates H(r, IDA0 ), and compares
this value with the value of H(r, IDA ). If the two values
agree, reader A will be the legitimate reader of this tag.
Once the tag successfully authenticates reader A, step 7 is
initialized. If two values are not equal, the authentication
fails.
7: The tag sends (1, (tidj )SA , H((tidj )SA , r), G, S) to
reader A. (tidj )SA is the value in the third row in the
routing table corresponding to i. 1 indicates that the
authentication is successful. G is equal to g xkl where kl
is the preceding reader’s private key . S is the preceding
reader’s signature and is equal to Sig(H(tidj , IDl )),
where IDl is the preceding reader’s ID. It proceeds to
step 8.
8: Reader A decrypts (tidj )SA to get the tidj , calculates
−1
−1
Gx = (g xkl )x = g kl , and uses g kl to get IDl by
checking the public key table. As reader A has IDl

Add-New-Node Mode. We divide this mode into cases: (1) the
added new node is in the same supply chain, which means
it has the parameter x but is not in the routing table; (2) the
new node is not in the routing table and does not belong to
the same supply chain system (without x).
In case (1), the tag arrives at reader B, which is in the
system but not in the routing table of the target tag. So the tag
fails to authenticate reader B in the normal mode and requires
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Tag j

Reader B(x)
probe

←−−−−−−−−−−−−
r
−−−−−−−−−−−−→

choose r
i

calculate H(r, IDB )

H(r,IDB )

IDB 0 ← routing table

←−−−−−−−−−−−−

?

H(r, IDB 0 ) = H(r, IDB )
0, H(vj ,r), r

−−−−−−−−−−−−→

vj , tidj ← route-change table by H(vj , r)
vj0 ← H(vj )
compute H(vj0 , r + 1)
g kl

IDl ← public key table
r+1,H(vj0 ,r+1)

←−−−−−−−−−−−−
?

H(H(vj ), r + 1) = H(vj0 , r + 1)
S, G

−−−−−−−−−−−−→
−1

Gx

−1

= (g xkl )x

= g kl

g kl

IDl ← public key table
verify S using g kl , tidj and IDl
calculate (g kB )x
calculate Sig(H(tidj , IDB ))
g xkB , Sig(H(tidj ,IDB ))

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−

G ← g xkB
S ← Sig(H(tidj , IDB ))
vj ← H(vj )
Fig. 2.

Protocol of Add-New-Node Case (1).

reader B to provide the evidence that B has the route-change
token for the tag. The protocol is given in Figure 2.
The first six steps are the exactly same as the normal mode,
therefore omitted.

reader B can find out the previous position. Reader B
can log tidj and IDl or submit these two values to
the online server. Reader B computes (g kB )x = g xkB
and Sig(H(tidj , IDB )), where kB is the private key of
reader B.
13: Reader B sends g xkB and Sig(H(tidj , IDB )) to the tag.
14: The tag updates G ← g xkB , S ← Sig(H(tidj , IDB )),
vj ← H(vj ).

7: The tag sends 0, H(vj , r), r to the reader B. 0 indicates
that additional information is required for authentication. The tag sends H(vj , r) to B and is expecting
H(H(vj ), r + 1) from B.
8: Reader B uses every vβ where β is an index of a tag
ID in the route-change table to calculate the value of
H(vβ , r) and compares it to the value of H(vj , r) until
it finds a vβ that satisfies H(vβ , r) = H(vj , r). The tag
ID corresponding with vβ in the route-change table is set
as tidj . Then, B calculates vj0 = H(vβ ) and H(vj0 , r+1).
Note that the route-change table can be updated according
to the back-end server’s information.
9: Reader B returns r + 1 and H(vj0 , r + 1).
10: The tag computes H(H(vj ), r + 1) and compares the
value with H(vj0 , r + 1). If they are equal, the authentication is successful. This means that reader B has received
the route-change token of this tag from the server.
11: The tag sends G and S to reader B.
−1
−1
12: Reader B calculates Gx = (g xkl )x = g kl and can
kl
use g to get IDl by checking the public key table. As
reader B has IDl and tidj now, it can verify the signature. By verifying the signature of the preceding reader,

As we can see, the only difference of this protocol from the
normal mode protocol is the authentication process of reader
B. If the authentication in the step 6 is not successful, the
tag needs to know whether reader B has the route-change
token from the server by sending the hashed value of challenge
vj and r + 1. If reader B has already got the route-change
token (vj , tidj ) from the server and added these two values
into the route-change table, reader B will be able to find the
value of vj by searching the route-change table and return
H(H(vj ), r + 1).
For case (2), a back-end server is online to support reader
C in the new node. The protocol is in Fig 3.
Because the new reader C in this mode is originally not
in this supply chain, reader C doesn’t have the parameter
x and route-change token from the server. It has to let the
online server to generate the H(vj0 , r + 1) which will be
passed to the tag for the authentication. So at step 9, reader
C passes H(vj , r) and r to the server with a signature.
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Tag j

Reader C

Server

probe

←−−−−−−−−−
r
−−−−−−−−−→

choose r
ID

i

C0

← routing table

calculate H(r, IDC )

H(r,IDC )

←−−−−−−−−−

?

H(r, IDC 0 ) = H(r, IDC )
0,H(vj ,r),r

Sig(H(vj , r), r)

−−−−−−−−−→

H(vj ,r),r,Sig(H(vj ,r),r)

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

vj , tidj ← ID-v table
vj0 ← H(vj )
compute H(vj0 , r + 1)
get tidj ,
r+1
r+1,H(vj0 ,r+1)

←−−−−−−−−−

and H(vj0 , r + 1)

G,S

Sig(G, r + 1)

(r+1,H(vj0 ,r+1),tidj )SC

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

H(H(vj ), r + 1)
?

= H(vj0 , r + 1)

−−−−−−−−−→

G,r+1,Sig(G,r+1)

−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Gx

get g kl

(r+1,g

x

,g kl )SC

←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

−1

= g kl

vj ← H(vj )

g kl

IDl ←public key table
calculate(g x )kC = g xkC
g xkC ,Sig(H(tidj ,IDC ))

←−−−−−−−−−−−−− and Sig(H(tidj , IDC ))

G ← g xkC
S ← Sig(H(tidj , IDC ))
vj ← H(vj )
Fig. 3.

Protocol of Add-New-Node Case (2).

system achieves the requirements.

The server searches the ID-v table to find the value of vj
and tidj , then calculates vj0 = H(vj ). The server creates
an authentication token (r + 1, H(vj0 , r + 1)) and sends it
and tidj to reader C in a public-key encrypted form. So
reader C gets the tidj and passes the authentication token
to the tag. After authenticating reader C, the tag returns
G and S to reader C. Without x, reader C is unable to
get the public key of the preceding reader by computing
−1
Gx . So reader C forwards G to the online server that
will in turn compute g kl for reader C. The server returns
g kl and g x to reader C. With g kl , reader C can find IDl
by searching the public key table. Reader C can use g x to
compute (g x )kC = g xkC without finding out the value of x.
Reader C also calculates the signature Sig(H(tidj , IDC ))
and sends g xkC and Sig(H(tidj , IDC )) to the tag. The tag
finally updates G ← g xkC and S ← Sig(H(tidj , IDC )).

A. Resistance to Replay Attack
Resistance to Replay Attack means that if the adversary
A can eavesdrop communication between tags and readers, it
cannot replay any information transferred in the communication. In our protocol, we use a random number r as nonce to
protect the system from the replay attack. Different sessions
have different values of r, so a message used in one session
cannot be reused in another session.
B. Forward Untraceability
Forward Untraceability means that given all communication
flows between a tag and a reader at time t, the adversary A
cannot use these information to trace the tag at a time t0 > t.
Our protocol only considers the authentication of a tag and
the verification of the preceding location of the tag, with no
information related to forward locations of the tag. Moreover,
the identity of a tag is not revealed in the protocol.

The main difference between these two cases is that the
online server does the calculation of (r + 1, H(vj0 , r + 1)) and
g kl instead of the reader C. This is because that reader C does
not have x and the route-change token.

C. Backward Untraceability
Backward Untraceability means that given all communication flows between a tag and a reader at time t, the
adversary A cannot use these information to trace the tag at
a time t0 < t. Our protocol requires the preceding location
verification by tags that sends the verification information to

IV. S ECURITY R EQUIREMENTS AND A NALYSIS
In this section, we discuss security requirements for our
RFID supply chain system we proposed and explain how the
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readers. Every tag stores the information G and S about its
preceding location. G is protected by the hardness of the
discrete logarithm and only authorized readers, which have
the secret key x can compute the preceding location’s public
−1
key by applying Gx . The preceding reader’s public key is
used to verify the signature S. So unauthorized readers will
not be able to track a tag’s last location.
D. Resistance to Reader Impersonation
Resistance to Reader Impersonation means that the adversary A cannot impersonate a reader so that it can extract useful
information from a legitimate tag. Reader impersonation is the
primary attack in this system. When an unauthorized reader
probes a tag, it should not be authenticated by the tag. It is
easy to find that our protocols are secure against this attack.
V. C ONCLUSION
We proposed an RFID authentication scheme for supply
chain applications. Our solution provides strong mutual authentication between tags and readers. We allow the authentication to be asymmetric, in the sense that tags are only
required to carry out very basic computation based on hashing
and readers can implement much more complex computations
such as encryption and digital signatures. Apart from strong
authentication, we allow the supply chain route to be authenticated and updated according to the need. In other words, we
allow a supply chain to be dynamically updated by adding
new nodes.
R EFERENCES
[1] A. Juels, “RFID security and privacy: A research survey,” IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 24(2), pp. 381–394, February
2006.
[2] “Wal-mart details RFID requirement,” November 6 2003,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/
642/1/1.
[3] A. Niemeyer, M. H. Pak, and S. E. Ramaswamy, “Smart tags for your
supply chain,” The McKinsey Quarterly, vol. 4, pp. 6–8, 2003.
[4] S. A. Weis, S. E. Sarma, and D. W. Engels, “Radio-frequency identification: Security risks and challenges,” Cryptobytes, vol. 6, no. 1, pp.
6–8, 2003.
[5] A. Juels, “Minimalist cryptography for low-cost RFID tags,” in Security
of Communication Networks(SCN) 2004, LNCS 3352. Springer, 2004,
pp. 149–164.
[6] T. Dimitriou, “A lightweight RFID protocol to protect against traceability
and cloning attacks,” in Proceedings of SECURECOMM’05. IEEE
Press, September 2005, pp. 59–66.
[7] S. A. Weis, S. E.Sarma, R. L.Rivest, and D. W.Engels, “Security and
privacy aspects of low-cost radio frequency identification systems,” in
Security in Pervasive Computing 2003, LNCS 2802. Springer, 2004,
pp. 201–212.
[8] M. Ohkubo, K. Suzuki, and S. Kinoshita, “Cryptographic approach to
privacy-friendly tags,” in RFID Privacy workshop. MIT, USA, 2003.
[9] I. Vajda and L. Buttyan, “Lightweight authentication protocols for
low-cost RFID tags,” Second Workshop on Security in Ubiquitous
Computing, 2003.
[10] D. Henrici and P. Müller, “Hash-based enhancement of location privacy
for radio-frequency identification devices using varying identifiers,” in
Pervasive Computing and Communications Security. IEEE Computer
Society, 2004, pp. 149–153.
[11] G. Avoine and P. Oechslin, “RFID traceability: A multilayer problem,”
in Financial Cryptography, LNCS 3570. Springer, 2005, pp. 125–140.
[12] D. Molnar and D. Wagner, “Privacy and security in library RFID: issues,
practices, and architectures,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security. IEEE Press, 2003, pp. 210–
219.

588

